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Additional Ways Of Minimizing Church
Counseling Liability ................................................... 259
I. INTRODUCTION

Pastors of churches and other clergypersons, who have been
involved in private counseling, have been especially susceptible to
lawsuits alleging clergy malpractice and other significant torts.1
Churches and other religious institutions are being subjected to suits
based on vicarious liability and/or direct liability in connection with tort
claims against pastors and other employees hired by these institutions.2
1. See, e.g., Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, 907 N.E.2d 683 (N.Y. Ct. App.
2009) (claims against a priest for breach of fiduciary duty and against a bishop and diocese alleging
negligent retention and supervision); Petrell v. Shaw, 902 N.E.2d 401 (Mass. 2009) (complaint filed
against a church diocese, bishops and others alleging breach of fiduciary duty, vicarious liability,
and negligent hiring, supervision and retention); Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007)
(claims against pastor, church, and elders for professional negligence, defamation, intentional
infliction of mental distress, and other actions after the termination of a counseling relationship
between claimant and the pastor); Wende C. v. United Methodist Church, 776 N.Y.S.2d 390 (App.
Div. 2004), aff’d, 794 N.Y.S.2d 282 (claims against a pastor and church officials asserting clergy
malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty); Mabus v. St. James Episcopal Church (Mabus I), 884
So.2d 747 (Miss. 2004) (en banc) (suit against a priest, church and diocese alleging clergy
malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, negligent infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy,
negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, and negligent retention and supervision);
Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198 (Utah 2001) (action for
clerical malpractice); Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir. 1994) (suit against a pastor and
church averring professional negligence, negligent infliction of mental distress, breach of fiduciary
duty, and a statutory violation); Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948
(Cal. 1988) (claims against a church and church-related counselors alleging wrongful death based
on “clergyman malpractice” and outrageous conduct); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct.
App.1987) (claims for defamation, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction of emotional distress,
and others).
2. See, e.g., Chenevert v. Redemptorists/Denver Province, No. 09-473-JJB, 2010 WL
1609971 (M.D. La. Apr. 20, 2010) (alleging vicarious liability against a Catholic church for the
harm sustained as a result of sexual abuse of plaintiff by a priest-claims of direct liability were also
made against the church for negligence, intentional infliction of mental distress, breach of fiduciary
duty, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud); Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for The Diocese of
Memphis, No. W2009-00986-COA-R10-CV, 2010 WL 2106222 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 27, 2010)
(asserting direct liability against a Catholic Diocese for sexual abuse of plaintiff by a priest arising
from the negligent hiring, supervision and retention of the priest, as well as breach of fiduciary
duty); Gray v. Darby, No. 08-CV-02527, 2009 U. S. Dist. LEXIS 25426 (E. D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2009)
(asserting the application of respondeat superior or vicarious liability to a church and its regional
Conference and District Superintendent for various torts and statutory violations of an acting pastor
at a school and childcare facility positioned on the church’s premises); Petrell v. Shaw, 902 N.E.2d
401 (Mass. 2009) (alleging vicarious liability; negligent hiring, retention and supervision; and other
claims against a diocese and several bishops); In re Roman Catholic Church of Diocese of Tucson,
No. CV 06-373-TUC-MHM, 2008 WL 509386 (D. Ariz. Feb. 22, 2008) (alleging the liability of a
diocese based on the doctrine of respondeat superior—vicarious liability—and several other
claims); Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, 907 N.E.2d 683 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2009)
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A primary goal of all religious institutions should be to develop
strategies of minimizing their liability for church-related counseling
services for the protection of the church and the parishioner, which are
addressed extensively in Part V of this article.
Counseling provided by a pastor may be nonsecular or religious,
thereby focusing on the provision of biblical or spiritual advice.
Conversely, the pastor’s counseling may be secular or professional,
which would not involve religious advice. Whether the advice is
nonsecular or secular, the pastor or other church official, who harms a
parishioner or non-parishioner, may be sued for damages due to clergy
malpractice in connection with such counseling.3 Courts, however, have
historically declined to allow recovery in torts cases in which the matter
to be resolved entailed a religious dispute as opposed to a secular
conflict.4 This avoidance of religious disputes by the courts is based on
the First Amendment Establishment and/or Free Exercise Clause, also
referred to as the religion clauses.5
Civil claims against clergypersons, asserting malpractice in
connection with spiritual ministry, spiritual counseling, and/or pastoral
counseling, have been litigated in at least the last thirty years under the
guise of clergy malpractice.6 The courts, however, have recognized a

(alleging the negligent retention and supervision of a priest by a diocese and a bishop); Schovanec
v. Archdiocese of Oklahoma City, 188 P.3d 158 (Okla. 2008) as corrected, (July 2, 2008); Doe v.
Liberatore, 478 F. Supp.2d 742 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (alleging vicarious liability; negligent hiring,
supervision and retention; and other actions against a diocese, a church bishop, a monk, and a
second priest); Mabus v. St. James Episcopal Church, 884 So.2d 747 (Miss. 2004) (pleading the
negligent retention and supervision of a priest by a church and diocese, as well as other tort causes
of action); Olson v. First Church of Nazarene, 661 N.W.2d 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003) (averring
negligent supervision of a pastor by the regional district of a church); Ayon v. Gourley, 47 F.
Supp.2d 1246 (D. Colo. 1998), aff’d on other grounds, 185 F.3d 873 (10th Cir. 1999) (claiming
negligent supervision of a priest by an archdiocese); Smith v. Privette, 495 S.E.2d 395 (N.C. 1998)
(asserting negligent supervision and retention of a clergyperson by a church and other ecclesiastical
bodies); Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 692 A.2d 441 (Me. 1997) (alleging
negligent supervision of a priest by a church); Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn,
654 N.Y.S.2d 791 (App. Div. 1997) (pleading negligent retention and supervision of a priest by a
diocese); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (alleging negligent retention and
supervision of a pastor by a religious governing body).
3. See infra Sections III, IV, and accompanying notes.
4. See infra Section IV.
5. Id.
6. Seemingly, there are no records prior to 1980 of any cases in which clergy malpractice
was asserted. The complaint in Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal.
1988), was originally filed on March 31, 1980 entitled “COMPLAINT FOR CLERGYMAN
MALPRACTICE: WRONGFUL DEATH, NEGLIGENCE, OUTRAGEOUS CONDUCT . . . .”
Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303, 309 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(Hanson, J., dissenting).
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number of suits against churches regarding nondoctrinal, as well as
doctrinal issues, for over a century.7 Furthermore, it appears there has
been an increase in the number of tort actions against clerics and
religious establishments for professional or clergy misconduct since
1980.8 According to one writer, a reason for this apparent escalation
may be the fact that fundamentalist churches are providing more
personal, spiritual, and psychological counseling to parishioners and

7. The following cases involve spiritual and nonspiritual-related complaints against church
officials, churches, and other religious institutions or organizations. See, e.g., Doe v. Brouillette,
906 N.E.2d 105 (Ill. App. Ct. 2009); Hyde Park Baptist Church v. Turner, No. 03-07-00437-CV,
2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 586 (Tex. App. Jan. 30, 2009); K. J. v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of
Stockton, No. C058034, 2009 Cal. App. LEXIS 538 (Cal. App. Apr. 10, 2009); Gray v. Darby, No.
08-CV-02527, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25426 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2009); Marmelstein v. Kehillat
New Hempstead, 892 N.E.2d 375 (N.Y. 2008); Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake
City, 156 P.3d 806 (Utah 2007); Bear Valley Church of Christ, 928 P.2d 1315 (Colo. 1996) (en
banc); Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991); Guinn v. Church of Christ of Collinsville, 775
P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989); Fisher v. Northmoor United Methodist Church, 679 S.W.2d 305 (Mo.Ct.
App.1984); Morgan v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 402 So.2d 640 (La. 1981); Helton v. Forest
Park Baptist Church, 589 S.W.2d 217 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979); Battig v. Hartford Accident & Indem.
Co., 482 F.Supp. 338 (W.D.La. 1977), aff’d, 608 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1979); Coolbaugh v. St. Peter’s
Roman Catholic Church, 115 A.2d 662 (Conn. 1955); Sullivan v. First Presbyterian Church
Waterloo, 152 N.W.2d 628 (Iowa 1967); Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church of the Sacred
Hearts of Jesus and Mary, 186 N.E. 798 (N.Y. 1933); Hudson v. Church of The Holy Trinity, 166
N.E. 306 (N.Y. 1929); Magnuson v. O’Dea, 135 P. 640 (Wash. 1913); Whittaker v. Sandford, 85 A.
399 (Me. 1912); Bruce v. Central Methodist Episcopal Church, 110 N.W. 951 (Mich. 1907);
Hellstern v. Katzer, 79 N.W. 429 (Wis. 1899); Davis v. Central Congregational Soc., 129 Mass.
367, 1880 WL 10838 (1880).
8. The list below contains examples of professional or clergy misconduct cases decided since
1980 when the complaint was originally filed in Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley,
763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988). The Nally case involved a wrongful death claim asserting clergy
malpractice against a Protestant church and four of its pastors. Additional examples of clergy
misconduct cases include: Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Strock v.
Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235 (Ohio 1988); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988) (en
banc); Bladen v. First Presbyterian Church of Sallisaw, 857 P.2d 789 (Okla. 1993); Schieffer v.
Catholic Archdiocese of Omaha, 508 N.W.2d 907 (1993); Bear Valley Church of Christ v. DeBose,
928 P.2d 1315 (Colo. 1996) (en banc); F. G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997); Sanders v.
Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1998); Teadt v. Lutheran Church Missouri
Synod, 603 N.W.2d 816 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999); Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints, 21 P.3d 198 (Utah 2001); Richelle v. Roman Catholic Archbishop, 130 Cal. Rptr. 2d 601 (Ct.
App. 2003), as modified, Mar. 17, 2003; Wende C. v. United Methodist Church, 776 N.Y.S.2d 390
(App. Div. 2004); Vione v. Tewell, 820 N.Y.S.2d 682 (Sup. Ct. 2006); Doe v. Liberatore, 478
F.Supp. 2d 742 (M.D. Pa. 2007); Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007),; Marmelstein
v. Kehillat New Hempstead: The Rav Aron Jofen Community Synagogue, 892 N.E.2d 375 (N.Y.
2008); Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Rochester, 907 N.E.2d 683 (N.Y. Ct. App. 2009);
Cerninka v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. X10UWYCV085008855S, 2009 WL
765486 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2009); Mallory v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No.
X10UWYCV075007645S, 2009 WL 765485 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2009); Gray v. Darby, No.
08-CV-02527, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25426 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 26, 2009); Petrell v. Shaw, 902 N.E.2d
401 (Mass. 2009).
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others.9 This movement by fundamentalist churches toward greater
involvement in the field of psychological counseling, as well as the
litigious nature of society, indicates a possible increase in future clergy
malpractice litigation.10 Churches in general appear to be providing
more counseling services to their congregants. Consequently, many
pastor-counselee relationships have resulted in negligent pastoral and/or
professional counseling, thereby engendering a number of lawsuits.
These lawsuits involving negligent counseling and other significant tort
claims include: assertions of negligent counseling by a protestant
minister resulting in a parishioner’s suicide;11 negligent marital
counseling resulting in a sexual relationship between a Roman Catholic
priest and a parishioner;12 disclosure of confidential communications by
an ordained Baptist minister to church officials and parishioners;13
defamation of a parishioner-counselee by a pastor after the parishioner
terminated their marital counseling relationship;14 invasion of privacy by
a pastor who agreed to provide family counseling to a husband and wife
and their children;15 and various other tort actions.16 It has been
recommended that churches and other religious organizations use
protective measures to minimize their liability for church-related
9. Lawrence M. Burek, Note, Clergy Malpractice: Making Clergy Accountable to a Lower
Power, 14 PEPP. L. REV. 137, 137-38 (1986).
10. Id.
11. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988).
12. See Destafano v. Grabrian, 729 P.2d 1018 (Colo. Ct. App. 1986), aff’d in part and rev’d
in part, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988) (en banc).
13. See Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987).
14. See Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007).
15. See Barnett, 723 S.W.2d at 544 See also Schauer v. Diocese of Green Bay, No.
2007AP1262, 2008 WL 2097379 (Wis. App. May 20, 2008) (claims made by plaintiff against a
priest and Diocese alleging sexual abuse of the plaintiff—when he was a student—during a
counseling session with the priest).
16. See, e.g., Chenevert v. Redemptorists/Denver Province, No. 09-473-JJB, 2010 WL
1609971 (M.D. La. Apr. 20, 2010) (alleging negligence, intentional infliction of mental distress,
breach of fiduciary duty, negligent misrepresentation, and fraud); Redwing v. Catholic Bishop for
The Diocese of Memphis, No. W2009-00986-COA-R10-CV, 2010 WL 2106222 (Tenn. Ct. App.
May 27, 2010) (alleging negligence of Diocese in hiring, supervising and retaining a priest who
sexually abused minors, and breach of fiduciary duty for failure to investigate, warn, and protect
against abuse); Petrell v. Shaw, 902 N.E.2d 401 (Mass. 2009) (alleging breach of fiduciary duty,
negligent conduct, and vicarious liability); K. J. v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Stockton, No.
C058034, 2009 Cal. App. LEXIS 538 (Cal. Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2009) (alleging negligence,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and constructive fraud); Hyde Park Baptist Church v.
Turner, No. 03-07-00437-CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 586 (Tex. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2009) (asserting
intentional torts and negligence); Marmelstein v. Kehillat New Hempstead, 892 N.E.2d 375 (N.Y.
2008) (claiming negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duty,
and other causes of action); Doe v. Liberatore, 478 F. Supp. 2d 742 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (claiming
assault, battery, negligence per se, breach of fiduciary duty, and other actions).
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counseling services.17 Church members and others who seek counseling
from pastors and professional counselors, who offer counseling services
at churches and other theological establishments, will also benefit from
these protective devices. It is important that churches consider the
suggestions outlined in Part V of this article focusing on such things as:
conducting background investigations to determine the experience,
credentials, criminal history and overall character of a pastor or
counselor applicant; creating a pastoral counseling policy for the church;
making sure that the pastoral counselor emphasizes biblical counseling;
employing a written counseling agreement; referring parishioners to
professional counselors when appropriate; avoiding particular
counseling situations; keeping thorough records of counseling sessions;
and adhering to state licensing laws applicable to professional
counselors. These and other helpful recommendations are addressed in
more detail in Part V as positive methods of minimizing church liability
and ultimately shielding the parishioner from unnecessary harm.
Part II of this article presents a discussion of the clergyperson’s
duty of care to parishioners. Part III addresses clergy malpractice, which
focuses on negligent pastoral counseling and judicial analyses of such
claims. Part IV examines First Amendment defenses to clergy
malpractice and other tort claims against pastors, churches and other
religious organizations with emphasis on the religion clauses. Finally,
Part V suggests various methods of minimizing liability for churchrelated counseling services.
II. THE CLERGYPERSON’S DUTY OF CARE
As with other negligence claims, duty of care is a required element
of proof in a clergy malpractice action.18 A defendant will not be subject
to liability for negligence unless the injured complainant can prove the
existence of a duty to use reasonable care, that there was a breach of that
duty, and that the breach of the duty proximately or legally caused the
damage.19 A duty is “a legally sanctioned obligation” owed by one
person to another.20 For instance, the court in one clergy malpractice

17. See infra section V.
18. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 955-56 (Cal. 1988)
19. Id. at 956; Petrell v. Shaw, 902 N.E.2d 401, 408 (Mass. 2009). See also Mabus v. St.
James Episcopal Church (Mabus I), 884 So.2d 747, 764 (Miss. 2004) (en banc) (stating in order
“[to] prevail on a negligence claim, the plaintiff must establish by a preponderance of the evidence
each of the elements of negligence: duty, breach, causation and injury”).
20. STEVEN H. GIFIS, LAW DICTIONARY 148 (1984).
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case21 identified several factors that must be weighed in deciding
whether a duty of care is in fact present in a given case.22 Those factors
comprise the following:
[F]oreseeability of harm to [the injured party], the degree of certainty
that [he] suffered injury, the closeness of the connection between
[defendants’] conduct and the injury suffered, the moral blame
attached to [defendants], the policy of preventing future harm, the
extent of the burden to the defendant[s] and consequences to the
community of imposing a duty to exercise care with resulting liability
for breach, and the availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for
the risk involved.23

Standard of care is one component of legal duty.24 A complainant
must identify the applicable standard of care in a malpractice case in
order to present appropriate evidence to the judge and/or jury concerning
the required conduct of a defendant.25 Standard of care pertains to the
behavior or conduct required of an individual in a given situation.26 The
reasonable person standard is basic and has been defined as “that degree
of care which a reasonably prudent person should exercise under the
same or similar circumstances.”27 It has been stated that professionals
and persons who engage in work requiring special skills must exercise a
standard of minimum skill, knowledge, ability, training, and competence
possessed by members of that profession, trade, or calling in good
standing, in addition to exercising reasonable and ordinary care in what
they do.28 Suits against religious establishments and clergypersons have
addressed the applicability of the professional standard to this unique
group, as well as issues germane to the clergy malpractice cause of

21. Nally, 763 P.2d at 948.
22. Id. at 956. For additional court analyses of the duty of care element in the context of other
clergy malpractice claims, see Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d
198, 204-06 (Utah 2001); Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1430-34 (7th Cir. 1994) (Ripple, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
23. Nally, 763 P.2d at 956.
24. W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 164 (5th ed.
1984); DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 270 (2000).
25. See, e.g., DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 24, at 631-33.
26. KEETON ET AL., supra note 24, at 164-208; DOBBS, supra note 24, at 270, 275-79;
STUART M. SPEISER, ET AL., 2A THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 9:4, at 525-35 (2009).
27. WILLIAM P. STATSKY, WEST’S LEGAL THESAURUS DICTIONARY 713 (1985).
28. STUART M. SPEISER, ET AL., 4 THE AMERICAN LAW OF TORTS § 15.1, at 453-54 (2009).
See also DOBBS, supra note 24, at 683-84 (addressing clergy malpractice, one type of professional
negligence); KEETON ET AL., supra note 24, at 185; WILLIAM L. PROSSER, ET AL., CASES AND
MATERIALS ON TORTS 168-96 (11th ed. 2005).
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action.29 Consequently, if a court determines that the professional
standard applies in a case, the clergy professional may be held liable for
damages if the court finds that his or her conduct has not conformed to
what a reasonable, prudent, competent professional would have done
under similar circumstances.30
III. CLERGY MALPRACTICE: NEGLIGENT PASTORAL COUNSELING
A.

Defining Clergy Malpractice

Clergy malpractice is one of many types of professional liability
actions. Professional liability pertains to actions brought against
professional persons in their capacity as professionals.31
The
malpractice of a professional, such as a clergyperson, may be described
generally as “the negligence of a professional in the exercise of that
profession.”32 Therefore, in order for liability to be imposed on a
professional person, there must be “an act by a person who, [while]
engaging in a particular profession under license or other privilege, fails
to exercise the required care and skill reasonably required of like
professionals; and who, by virtue of that negligence, causes . . . injury to
the person to whom the professional duty is owed.”33 A claim for clergy
malpractice generally pertains to negligent “pastoral counseling and is
based on the alleged wrongful conduct or advice of the clergy member in
causing the situation presented for counseling to deteriorate further.”34
29. See, e.g., Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir. 1994); Franco v. The Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198 (Utah 2001); Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex.
2007); Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988); Milla v.
Tamayo, 232 Cal. Rptr. 685 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988)
(en banc); Baumgartner v. First Church of Christ Scientist, 490 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986);
Strata v. Patin, 545 So.2d 1180 (La. App. 1989); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987); Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991); Lund v. Caple, 675 P.2d 226 (Wash. 1984).
30. See, e.g., MARTIN WEINSTEIN, SUMMARY OF AMERICAN LAW 522-23 (1988); Dausch v.
Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir. 1994).
31. John W. Wade, An Overview of Professional Negligence, 17 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 465,
465-66 (1987).
32. Weinstein, supra note 30, at 522. See Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 586 (Ohio 1991)
(describing “clergy malpractice” focusing on the standard of care component of such a claim); see
generally DOBBS, supra note 24, at 683-84.
33. Weinstein, supra note 30, at 522. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A
(1965); DOBBS, supra note 24, at 681-88.
34. Louis A. Frumer and Melvin I. Friedman, Religious Organizations and Institutions,
Personal Injury—Actions, Defenses, Damages, § 117.04 [2][c] (MB) (2010). One case described
clergy malpractice as “the failure to exercise the degree of care and skill normally exercised by
members of the clergy in carrying out their professional duties.” Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584,
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586 (Ohio 1991). See, e.g., Petrell v. Shaw, 902 N.E.2d 401 (Mass. 2009). In the Petrell case, a
female parishioner sued a church and three bishops for breach of fiduciary duty, negligent hiring
and retention, and other wrongful acts. The parishioner claimant sought marriage counseling from
the parish rector, and he initiated a sexual relationship with the parishioner which resulted in her
filing for divorce. Id. at 404-05. Marmelstein v. Kehillat New Hempstead, 892 N.E.2d 375 (N.Y.
2008). In Marmelstein, a claim was filed by the claimant who was enticed into a sexual relationship
with an Orthodox Jewish rabbi during a period that he was counseling the claimant concerning
various personal, financial, and legal problems. The claimant alleged intentional and negligent
infliction of mental distress, breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and negligent retention of the rabbi on
the part of the synagogue. Id. at 376-77. Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007). In
the Westbrook case, a former parishioner, who had been receiving marital counseling from the
church pastor, sued the pastor and other officials for professional negligence, defamation,
intentional infliction of mental distress, and breach of fiduciary duty. Id. at 392-94. Vione v.
Tewell, 820 N.Y.S.2d 682 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 2006). The parishioner complainant sued his former
minister-counselor, the church, and others, seeking damages due to an affair the minister was having
with the parishioner’s wife while the couple was receiving marriage counseling. Id. at 683-84.
Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). In the Hester case, a complaint was filed
by a husband and wife alleging six causes of action, including ministerial malpractice. Id. at 549.
Among other things, the plaintiffs sought damages from the defendant, a clergyman, for negligent
counseling. Id. at 549-50, 554. See also Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235 (Ohio 1988). In
Strock, the court relied on Hester and dismissed a clergy malpractice suit against a Lutheran
minister, who was accused of participating in a voluntary sexual relationship with the plaintiff’s
wife. Id. at 1236, 1239-40. The plaintiff and his wife were receiving marital counseling from the
minister. Id. at 1236.
The following articles address the subject of clergy malpractice and/or other clergyrelated issues: Freddie Baird, Tyla Law for the Clergy Conference: Avoiding Legal Landmines, 60
TEX. B. J. 344 (1997); Burek, supra note 9; Steven Chase, Clergy Malpractice: The Cause of
Action That Never Was, 18 N.C. CENT. L. J. 163 (1989); Marie M. Fortune, et al., Introduction, 4 J.
OF RELIGION & ABUSE 1 (2002); Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment Institutions: Of
Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 79 (2009); Ruth Jones, The Extrajudicial
Resolution of Sexual Abuse Cases: Can the Church be a Resource for Survivors? 38 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 351 (2005); Kimmerly Anne Klee, Note, Clergy Malpractice: Bad News for the Good
Samaritan or a Blessing in Disguise?, 17 U. TOL. L. REV. 209 (1985); Greg Slater, Note, Nally v.
Grace Community Church of the Valley: Absolution for Clergy Malpractice?, 1989 B.Y.U. L. REV.
913 (1989); Zshonette Reed, Note & Comment, Clergy Malpractice: Defining the Duty and
Dismissing the Claim, 4 J. LEGAL ADVOC. & PRAC. 122 (2002); Janna Statz Nugent, Note, A
Higher Authority: The Viability of Third Party Tort Actions Against a Religious Institution
Grounded on Sexual Misconduct by a Member of the Clergy, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 970 (2003);
Stephanie D. Young, Note, Sexual Molestation Within America’s Parishes and Congregations:
Should the Church be ‘ Thy Priest’s Keeper’?, 91 W. VA. L. REV. 1097 (1989); and Constitutional
Law-Free Exercise Clause-Texas Supreme Court Holds That Trial Court Lacks Subject Matter
Jurisdiction Over Professional Negligence Claim Against Professional Counselor/Church Pastor,
121 HARV. L. REV. 676 (2007).
The following books address the topic of clergy malpractice and/or clergy-related matters:
DAVID D. BALKUM, SHEEP AMONG WOLVES: TEXAS CHURCHES AND THE LAW (Pleasant Word
2003); NICHOLAS P. CAFARDI, BEFORE DALLAS (Paulist Press 2008); C. R. CAMBRIDGE, FORGIVE
US OUR TRESPASSES (Hollis Books 1999); DOBBS, supra note 24 at 681-88; PATRICK FLEMING ET
AL. , BROKEN TRUST (Crossroad Pub. Co. 2007); RONALD B. FLOWERS, THAT GODLESS COURT?
(2d ed. Westminster John Knox Press 2005); K. A. FLYNN, THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF WOMEN BY
MEMBERS OF THE CLERGY (McFarland & Co. 2003); MARIE M. FORTUNE, IS NOTHING SACRED?
WHEN SEX INVADES THE PASTORAL RELATIONSHIP (Harper & Row 1989); GIBBS LAW FIRM, P. A.,
INFORMING THE FAITHFUL (Christian Law Association 2006); S. J. GRENZ & R. D. BELL, BETRAYAL
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Pastoral counseling has been defined by one writer as “the use by clergy
of counseling and psychotherapeutic methods to enable individuals,
couples, and families to handle constructively their personal crises and
problems in living. Pastoral counseling draws on insights from
contemporary understanding of human personality, therapeutic methods
from current counseling approaches, and scriptural and theological
resources.”35
A survey of cases has revealed that courts rarely provide a complete
definition of clergy malpractice. One writer has created a description
from a few cases and other sources. He has stated that the courts appear
to be thinking that clergy malpractice is:
(1) negligent conduct that does not qualify as an intentional tort (2) in
carrying out a religious act or duty (3) by one in a religious calling (4)
directed toward a ‘client’ who has voluntarily accepted the authority or
services of the religious actor as being religious in character and (5) of
such a nature that legal adjudication would require consideration of
religious doctrine or at least religious practices or would otherwise
burden the free exercise of religion.36

A cause of action for clergy malpractice, as with other professional
negligence cases, requires the claimant to establish a duty of care based
on the professional standard of care, a breach of that duty, cause in fact,
proximate or legal cause, and damage.37 More specifically, the elements
OF TRUST: CONFRONTING AND PREVENTING CLERGY SEXUAL MISCONDUCT (2d ed. Baker Books
2001); E. A. HORST, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ABOUT CLERGY SEXUAL MISCONDUCT (The
Liturgical Press 2000); MARGARET C. JASPER, RELIGION AND THE LAW (Oceana Publications
1998); K. A. MCCLINTOCK, PREVENTING SEXUAL ABUSE IN CONGREGATIONS: A RESOURCE FOR
LEADERS (The Alban Institute 2004); THOMAS G. PLANTE, SIN AGAINST THE INNOCENTS (Praeger
Publishers 2004); W. A. Stacey et al., How Much Clergy Malfeasance is Really Out There? A
Victimization Survey of Prevalence and Perceptions, in A. SHUPE, ET AL., BAD PASTORS: CLERGY
MISCONDUCT IN MODERN AMERICA 187-213 (New York University Press 2000); THOMAS F.
TAYLOR, SEVEN DEADLY LAWSUITS: HOW MINISTERS CAN AVOID LITIGATION AND REGULATION
(Abingdon Press 1996).
35. Patrick I. Shea, Constitutional Issues Involved in Regulation of Spiritual Counseling and
the Duty to Train, in TORT AND RELIGION 1 (ABA 1990). See, e.g., Nally v. Grace Community
Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988); Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987).
36. DOBBS, supra note 24, at 683. See also id. nn.24-27 (citing Bear Valley Church of Christ
v. DeBose, 928 P.2d 1315, 1320 (Colo. 1996) (en banc) (pertaining to whether the defendant’s
conduct was religious); Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584, 586 (Ohio 1991) (concerning elements (1),
(2) and (3) in the accompanying text to this footnote indicating that “clergy malpractice” does not
include torts like battery, only the omission to exercise that level of care and skill ordinarily
exercised by clergypersons in performing their professional responsibilities); F. G. v. MacDonell,
696 A.2d 697 (N.J. 1997) (addressing the concern of courts if faced with malpractice or sexual
misconduct cases that involve free exercise of religion doctrines or practices)).
37. See Mabus v. St. James Episcopal Church, 884 So.2d 747, 764 (Miss. 2004) (en banc).
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of proof require the breach of a duty of professional care by the
clergyperson in providing pastoral counseling or other religious services,
which is factually and legally the cause of the parishioner’s or claimant’s
injury.38
B.

Judicial Analyses of Clergy Malpractice Claims

In recent years, courts throughout the country have frequently been
faced with claims against clergypersons and churches alleging clergy
malpractice39. Usually, these professional negligence claims have been
rejected by courts based on one or both First Amendment religion
clauses40 and/or because of the reluctance of courts generally to apply to
clerics the same level of care imposed upon mental health and other
medical professionals.41

38. See TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 110. See, e.g., Hester v. Barnett, 723 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1987). The Hester court, in referring to malpractice involving the clergy, stated the following:
It is a theory of tort . . . which presupposes that every cleric owes, the same duty of care,
whatever the religious order which granted ordination, or the cleric serves, or the beliefs
espoused. It is a theory of tort, moreover, which inevitably involves the court in a
judgment of the competence, training, methods and content of the pastoral function in
order to determine whether the cleric breached the duty “to act with that degree of skill
and learning ordinarily used in the same or similar circumstances by members of that
profession.”
Id. at 553.
39. See supra note 8.
40. The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses are the two religion provisions in the First
Amendment. The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. See,
e.g., Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007) (discussing the Free Exercise and
Establishment Clauses); Gulbraa v. Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints, 159 P.3d 392, 394-96 (Utah Ct. App. 2007) (emphasizing the Establishment Clause).
For a discussion of the two First Amendment religion clauses, see infra Section IV and
accompanying notes.
41. See Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948, 959-61 (Cal. 1988);
White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315, 1318-19 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). The facts in the White case are
similar to those in Nally. In White, the Utah Court of Appeals considered and dismissed the
claimants’ clergy malpractice action. The parents alleged negligent failure by clergy to refer their
son “to trained professionals.” The White court stated:
[A]ppellant wishes to impose a duty upon [clergy] to make further inquiry into the
alleged family conflicts, and then, if beyond [their] expertise, refer [parishioners] to
others who are qualified to treat such problems. Under the present circumstances,
charging lay clergy with this duty of care goes too far because it approaches . . . the same
level of care imposed upon trained professionals in medicine and psychology.
....
“Even assuming that workable standards of care could be established in the present case
. . . [s]uch a duty would necessarily be intertwined with the religious philosophy of the
particular denomination or ecclesiastical teachings of the religious entity.”
Id. (quoting Nally, 763 P.2d at 960).
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The case of Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley42 was
filed on March 31, 198043 and has precipitated a number of clergy
malpractice lawsuits across the United States. The most recent Nally
opinion was issued by the Supreme Court of California in 1988 in which
the court declined to impose on nontherapist pastoral counselors the duty
to prevent suicide or to refer a potentially suicidal person to a licensed
mental health professional once suicide becomes a foreseeable risk.44 A
wrongful death action was filed by the decedent’s parents against a
Protestant church and four of its pastors, asserting clergy malpractice.45
Defendants were accused of negligence and outrageous conduct for
failure to prevent the decedent’s suicide.46 The deceased had a history of
emotional problems, which he experienced between 1974 and 1979.47
During that period, he was active in a myriad of activities and ministries
sponsored by his church.48 Furthermore, during the period that the
decedent was associated with the church, he experienced personal and
family difficulties that necessitated pastoral counseling, secular therapy,
and physical examinations by medical doctors.49 Prior to the decedent
committing suicide by shooting himself in the head with a shotgun, he
had participated in at least five pastoral counseling sessions and had
attempted to commit suicide by consuming an overdose of an
antidepressant drug prescribed by a medical doctor.50 Although the
decedent indicated his desire to take his own life on more than one
occasion, the church clerics who were involved in pastoral or spiritual
counseling did not refer decedent to a psychiatrist initially.51 One of the
clerics named in the suit did, however, remind the decedent of the
decedent’s appointments with the decedent’s psychiatrist, who treated
the decedent after he attempted suicide and was hospitalized.52
In addressing the issue of whether the defendants, nontherapist
counselors, have a legal duty to refer potentially suicidal persons to
42. 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988).
43. Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 204 Cal. Rptr. 303, 309-10 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1984) (California Court of Appeals dissent). This California Court of Appeals opinion also
contains information concerning the plaintiffs’ complaint (asserting clergyman malpractice for
negligent counseling).
44. Nally, 763 P.2d at 960-61.
45. Id at 949.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 950-52.
48. Id. at 950.
49. Nally, 763 P.2d at 950-51.
50. Id. at 949-51.
51. Id. at 951-52.
52. Id at 951.
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licensed mental health professionals once self-destruction becomes
reasonably foreseeable, the court in Nally considered the existence of a
special relationship between the deceased and the defendants, and failed
to find one.53 The court cited two California cases, Meier v. Ross
General Hospital54 and Vistica v. Presbyterian Hospital,55 where a duty
to prevent foreseeable suicide was imposed on hospitals, which accepted
the responsibility of caring for patients who were suicidal, conditioned
on the existence of a special relationship between each hospital and its
patient.56 Contrary to Meier and Vistica, the decedent in Nally did not
have a supervised medical relationship with the pastoral counselors at
his church.57 Furthermore, neither Meier nor Vistica proposed the
extension of a “duty of care to personal or religious counseling
relationships in which one person provided nonprofessional guidance to
another seeking advice and [where] the counselor had no control over
the environment of the individual being counseled.”58
The court considered whether there was a sufficient causal
connection between the nontherapist pastoral counselor’s conduct (his
failure to refer) and the decedent’s suicide.59 This causal link was found
to be weak because the pastoral counselors arranged appointments,
promoted visits and urged cooperation with the five physicians and one
psychiatrist who examined the decedent during the period subsequent to
his attempts to commit suicide.60 The court noted that “[m]ere
foreseeability of the harm or knowledge of the danger is insufficient to
create a legally cognizable special relationship giving rise to a legal duty
to prevent harm.”61 The Nally court also commented on the fact that
members of the clergy are not required by legislation to obtain licenses
like “marriage, family, child and domestic counselors.”62 In brief, the
court noted that “the Legislature has recognized that access to the clergy
for counseling should be free from state imposed counseling standards,
and that ‘the secular state is not equipped to ascertain the competence of

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
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counseling when performed by those affiliated with religious
organizations.’ ”63
A federal court decision involving a counseling relationship
between a parishioner and a pastor originated in Illinois, a state that has
rejected clergy malpractice claims.64 Affirming in part the judgment of
the United States District Court, the United States Court of Appeals,
Seventh Circuit, explained why it approved of the District Court’s
rationale concerning the plaintiff parishioner’s professional negligence
action in the 1994 case of Dausch v. Rykse.65 The Court of Appeals
agreed with the District Court that the professional negligence action
was actually one for clergy malpractice, which was a claim that had been
soundly repudiated by Illinois courts, a position similar to that taken by
some other courts in this country.66
According to the parishioner plaintiff’s complaint in the Dausch
case, the pastor defendant held himself out, and the church defendants
represented as well, that the pastor was “a duly qualified person engaged
in providing psychological counseling”67 to congregants. In order for
the parishioner plaintiff to cope with depression and other emotional
problems she was having, during a period of about two years and five
months beginning in January of 1988, the plaintiff sought psychological
counseling from the pastor.68 The plaintiff alleged that during this
professional counseling relationship, the pastor “‘compelled,
encouraged, fostered, and engaged in dangerous and improper
counseling relations with plaintiff,’”69 which “included sexual contact
during the course of the psychotherapy.”70 Furthermore, the parishioner

63. Id. at 959-60.
64. Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1428 (7th Cir. 1994).
65. Id. at 1428.
66. Id. at 1428, 1432 & n.4 (citing Handley v. Richards, 518 So.2d 682 (Ala. 1987); Moses v.
Diocese, 863 P.2d 310 (Colo. 1993); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275 (Colo. 1988) (en banc);
Strock v. Pressnell, 527 N.E.2d 1235 (Ohio 1988); Byrd v. Faber, 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991); Doe
v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 862 S.W.2d 338 (Mo. 1993) (clergy malpractice action defeated on
other grounds); Bladen v. First Presbyterian Church, 857 P.2d 789 (Okla. 1993) (clergy malpractice
action defeated on other grounds); Schieffer v. Catholic Archdiocese, 508 N.W.2d 907 (Neb. 1993);
Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988); Fontaine v. Roman
Catholic Church, 625 So.2d 548 (La. Ct. App. 1993); Jones by Jones v. Trane, 591 N.Y.S.2d 927
(Sup. Ct. 1992); E. J. M. v. Archdiocese, 622 A.2d 1388 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993)). As stated in
Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir. 1994) (Ripple, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part),
the courts in the preceding cases have declined to acknowledge clergy malpractice actions except
for the Doe and Bladen courts that defeated the action on other grounds.
67. Dausch, 52 F.3d at 1428.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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plaintiff alleged that “the church defendants knew or should have known
In the plaintiff’s
of these improper counseling relations.”71
memorandum in response to the defendants’ motions to dismiss the
complaint, the plaintiff stated that she was told by the pastor defendant
that her condition required secular psychological counseling, not
religious counseling, because religion did not apply to her case.72 The
plaintiff alleged that she became very attached to the pastor and preoccupied with the therapy, which the plaintiff believed was being
provided by a “capable trained professional” upon whom she could
depend for help in managing her personal difficulties.73 Approximately
six months after the inception of the counseling relationship, in June of
1988, the pastor allegedly gave the parishioner plaintiff the ultimatum in
which the pastor stated: “I have been giving to you, and I need
something back for my services. You must give back to me or I will not
work with you anymore.”74 Allegedly, this is the point at which the
therapy sessions began to involve sexual relations between the plaintiff
and the pastor defendant lasting until May of 1990.75
The Dausch court indicated that those courts that have considered,
but disallowed clergy malpractice claims, have acknowledged the free
exercise of religion implications of that acknowledgement.76 Free
exercise of religion considerations in this regard, however, would be
impertinent if the pastor defendant’s behavior towards the parishioner
plaintiff was not a part of the church’s beliefs and practices.77 The
United States Court of Appeals reiterated the United States District
Court’s conclusion that the parishioner failed to sufficiently assert that
the psychological counseling provided by the pastor defendant was
separate from the religious beliefs and practices of the church.78
Therefore, First Amendment Free Exercise Clause considerations
prevented the parishioner from having a valid action against the church
defendants.79
Even if the court in Dausch decided to recognize a claim for clergy
malpractice, the church defendants could not be found vicariously liable
for the wrongful conduct of the pastor just because he was an employee
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
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of the church defendants.80 The pastor’s actions toward the parishioner
were “solely for [the pastor’s] . . . own benefit and not . . . part of his
ministerial duties.”81 No allegation was made by the parishioner “that
the church defendants knew or should have known” about the pastor’s
sexual misconduct or that there was a need to exert control over him.82
Consequently, due to this lack of awareness of the pastor’s inappropriate
relations with the parishioner plaintiff or the need to control the pastor’s
behavior, the church defendants could not be held liable for “failing to
exercise reasonable care over . . . [the pastor] when acting outside of the
scope of his employment.”83 As to the church defendants, the United
States Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s dismissal of the
parishioner plaintiff’s professional negligence claim (which the court
characterized more accurately as clergy malpractice).84 The United
States District Court’s dismissal of that same claim against the pastor
defendant, however, was reversed by the United States Court of
Appeals, and the case was remanded.85
The Supreme Court of Utah considered a clerical malpractice action
and other claims in Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints,86 involving harm allegedly sustained by plaintiffs (a former
church member and her parents) caused by advice they received during
religious counseling sessions provided by the Latter-day Saints (LDS)
Church defendants.87 According to the complaint, the plaintiffs (Lynette
Earl Franco and her parents) requested religious counseling from the
bishop of their LDS Church ward88 and from the Church stake89
president after plaintiff Franco, then fourteen, remembered being
sexually abused when she was seven years of age.90 The offender was
fourteen at the time he committed the wrongdoing, and the abuse was

80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Dausch, 52 F.3d at 1425, 1428.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 1429.
85. Id.
86. 21 P.3d 198 (Utah 2001). In addition to clerical malpractice, the plaintiffs in Franco
asserted gross negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duty,
intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud. Id. at 201.
87. Id. at 200.
88. A “ward” has been defined as “an ecclesiastical division of the LDS Church, based upon
geographical area.” Id. at 200 n.1.
89. A “stake” has been defined as “an ecclesiastical division of the LDS Church that consists
of several wards.” Id. at 200 n.3. One who serves as “stake president” in the LDS Church “is the
ecclesiastical leader of a stake.” Id. at 200 n.4.
90. Franco, 21 P.3d at 200.
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allegedly so extreme that Franco repressed the memory of the
incidents.91 Both Franco and her offender were members of the same
church at the time the sexual abuse occurred.92
The advice given to Franco during the counseling sessions was to
“forgive, forget, and seek Atonement.”93 Franco requested that the two
church defendants, who were counseling her, make a referral to a
licensed mental health professional once Franco discovered the need for
additional therapy.94 Although Franco and her parents were sent to a
mental health center, the doctor defendant to whom they were referred
was not a licensed mental health professional in the state of Utah.95
Furthermore, the doctor’s advice to Franco was similar to that of the
church defendants, which was for Franco “to forgive . . . and forget the
incidents of sexual abuse rather than to inform the police.”96 Since this
advice was unacceptable, Franco and her parents procured the services
of a different secular counselor, who subsequently informed the police
of the sexual abuse.97 This in turn led to Franco being “ostracized and
denigrated” by the other church members, with the approval of the
bishop and the president, who were the LDS Church officials that
initially provided the religious counseling to Franco and her parents.98
Due to the maltreatment she received from the other parishioners,
Franco decided to leave the LDS Church.99
The court in the Franco case discussed the adjudication of claims
for clergy malpractice even though the plaintiffs decided to abandon
their malpractice action on this appeal to the Utah Supreme Court.100
The frequency and uniform rejection of clergy malpractice litigation
based on the First Amendment in recent years were noted by the court in
spite of the controversial nature of this type of action101 as illustrated in
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 201.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Franco, 21 P.3d at 201.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 205-06.
101. Id. at 204. See, e.g., Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1432 (7th Cir. 1994) (Ripple, J.
concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Coffey J. concurring); Amato v. Greenquist, 679
N.E.2d 446, 453 (Ill. App. 1997); Scheiffer v. Catholic Archdiocese, 508 N.W.2d 907, 912 (Neb.
1993). Generally, these courts have stated that clergy malpractice actions would “entangle the
courts in the examination of religious doctrine, practice or church polity,” which is disallowed by
the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints, 21 P.3d 198, 204 (Utah 2001).
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Dausch v. Rykse,102 Amato v. Greenquist,103 Schieffer v. Catholic
Archdiocese,104 Byrd v. Faber,105 Schmidt v. Bishop,106 White v.
Blackburn,107 and Nally v. Grace Community Church of the Valley.108
In analyzing the plaintiffs’ three other negligence-based claims—
namely gross negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress and
breach of fiduciary duty109–the court in Franco indicated its agreement
with the LDS Church defendants’ argument that these claims were
simply “a roundabout way of alleging clergy malpractice.”110 More
precisely, the court determined that the gist or substance of plaintiff
Franco’s three negligence-based claims was that the LDS Church
defendants provided bad advice, which amounted to a mishandling of
the pastoral counseling relationship and duties.111 Consequently, the
court had to address the real question in this case—clergy malpractice—
regardless of Franco and her parents naming the three negligence-based
claims in their complaint as gross negligence, negligent infliction of
emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary duty.112 These misdeeds,
allegedly committed by the LDS Church defendants, entailed breaching
“a duty owed to Franco by advising her to ‘forgive, forget, and seek
Atonement’ or by advising her to seek outside help from [defendant]
Browning, an unlicensed therapist.”113
The court stated how the Franco case is similar to the Nally114 and
White115 cases, also involving the mishandling of religious counseling

102. 52 F. 3d 1425, 1432 (7th Cir. 1994) (Ripple, J. concurring in part and dissenting in part,
joined by Coffey, J. concurring).
103. 679 N.E.2d 446 ( Ill. App. 1997).
104. 508 N.W.2d 907 (Neb. 1993).
105. 565 N.E.2d 584 (Ohio 1991).
106. 779 F. Supp.321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
107. 787 P.2d 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
108. 763 P.2d 948 (Cal.1988).
109. Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198, 205-06 (Utah
2001).
110. Id. at 205.
111. Id.
112. Id. (citing Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F. 3d 1425, 1438 (7th Cir. 1994) (“stating that [the]
district court correctly determined that [the] plaintiff’s claim for breach of fiduciary duty was
‘simply an elliptical way of alleging clergy malpractice’ ”); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321,
326 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (stating that “as with her negligence claim, [plaintiff’s] fiduciary duty claim is
merely another way of alleging that the [clergyman] grossly abused his pastoral role, that is, that he
engaged in malpractice”); Amato v. Greenquist, 679 N.E. 2d 446, 451 (Ill. App. 1997) (“stating that
‘we will not determine the justiciability of [plaintiff’s] counts based upon the nomenclature used by
the plaintiff in entitling the counts’ in determining whether a negligence claim against a cleric is
essentially a malpractice claim”).
113. Franco, 21 P.3d at 205.
114. 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988).
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duties where the claimants asserted clergy malpractice.116 A resolution
of that claim could not be made absent an initial determination of
whether the LDS Church defendants carried out their counseling
responsibilities in accordance with “the level of expertise expected of a
similar professional, i.e., a reasonably prudent bishop, priest, rabbi,
minister, or other cleric in . . . [the] state [of Utah].”117 In fact, the
malpractice theory, in a case such as this involving a cleric who is a LDS
Church bishop, required the application of the professional standard of
care, which is used to determine whether the bishop “breached the duty
to act with that degree of ‘skill and knowledge normally possessed by
members of that profession.’”118 Interpreting a duty such as this would
mandate that a court articulate the standard to be complied with by other
reasonable clergypersons in the execution of their religious counseling
obligations, which would involve the courts in formulating “the training,
skill, and standards”119 applicable to clergypersons of various religious
denominations throughout the state that declare “widely varying
beliefs.”120 The Franco court decided that such a task or objective was
impossible and unconstitutional; therefore, if the court were to establish
the standard of care, et cetera, applicable to clergypersons performing
religious counseling, it would encourage “an excessive government
entanglement with religion,”121 thereby violating the Establishment
Clause of the First Amendment.122
Recently, the Supreme Court of Texas dismissed several tort claims
against a pastor, three church elders, and the Crossland Community
Bible Church in the case of Westbrook v. Penley.123 The former church
member plaintiff communicated confidential information to Westbrook,
the pastor, who subsequently disclosed that information in a letter to the
115. 787 P.2d 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
116. Franco, 21 P.3d at 204 (citing Nally, 763 P.2d 948; White, 787 P.2d 1315).
117. Franco, 21 P.3d at 205.
118. Id. at 205-06 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1965)).
119. Franco, 21 P. 3d. at 206.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing Dausch, 52 F. 3d at 1432 (declaring “that an evaluation of a clergy malpractice
claim would require courts to evaluate and investigate religious tenets and doctrines”); Hester v.
Barnett, 723 S.W, 2d 544, 553 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (“stating that clergy malpractice would force
courts to judge ‘competence, training, methods and content of the pastoral function’”); F.G. v.
MacDonell, 696 A. 2d 697, 706 (N.J. 1997) (O’Hern, J., dissenting) (expressing the view “that
creating a tort of clergy malpractice would ‘establish an official religion of the state’”); Bladen v.
First Presbyterian Church of Sallisaw, 857 P. 2d 789, 797 (Okla. 1993) (declaring that “[o]nce a
court enters the realm of trying to define the nature of advice a minister should give a parishioner,
serious First Amendment issues are implicated”).
123. 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007).
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congregants and encouraged them to shun the plaintiff, Penley, for
entering into a “biblically inappropriate relationship.”124 The church’s
constitution allowed for the application of the disciplinary process to
parishioners who engaged in serious misconduct such as that engaged in
by the plaintiff.125 Westbrook, a pastor and a licensed professional
marriage counselor, along with the other church-related defendants, were
sued for professional negligence (malpractice), breach of fiduciary duty,
defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress.126 Plaintiff
sought counseling initially from the defendant Westbrook, who was a
fellow parishioner at that time.127 The plaintiff paid for two or three of
the sessions.128 Later, Westbrook and others formed a new church, and
Westbrook was elected pastor.129 A constitution and statement of faith
were created containing a disciplinary policy to which all membership
applicants were required to indicate their willingness to comply.130 As
with all applicants, the plaintiff agreed to abide by the church
constitution131 that contained the following ecclesiastical disciplinary
policy:132
We believe that one of the primary responsibilities of the church is to
maintain the purity of the Body. We are directed by God to be holy.
In recognition of the importance of this obligation, the elders will
biblically and lovingly utilize every appropriate means to restore
members who find themselves in patterns of serious misconduct.
When efforts at restoration fail, the elders will apply the Biblical
teaching on church discipline, which could include revocation of
membership, along with an appropriate announcement made to the
membership (Matt 18:15-17; 1 Cor 5:1-5; Gal 6:1, 2; 2 Thes 3:6).133
[Additionally], [t]he church’s constitution provided that, if a member
engages in conduct that “violates Biblical standards, or which is
detrimental to the ministry, unity, peace or purity of the church,” and
the member is unrepentant, “the elders will follow our Lord’s
instructions from Matthew 18:15-20.”134 If the member remains

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 391.
Id.
Id. at 394.
Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 392.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 392-93, 402.
Id. at 392.
Id.
Matthew 18:15-17 of the Holy Bible states:
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unrepentant and chooses not to resign, the constitution instructs the
church authority to revoke the parishioner’s membership and announce
the member’s removal to the congregation. The church’s stated goal is
“to encourage repentance and restoration of fellowship with the Lord
and His people.”135

The court in Westbrook recognized a strong constitutional
presumption that supports protecting the interest of the church in
handling its own affairs.136 Therefore, plaintiff-Penley’s secular interest
in confidentiality was found to be less important than the church’s
interest.137 Here, the First Amendment defense applied to the church’s
interest, because this matter involved the defendant-pastor’s presumed
duty to the plaintiff and the other congregants to adhere to the
requirements of the church’s disciplinary policy and other provisions of
the church constitution.138 It is clear that defendant-Westbrook’s
position as pastor of the Cross Land Community Bible Church, as well
as his pastor-parishioner relationship with plaintiff-Penley, imposed this
obligation on Westbrook.139
Generally, when confronted with conflicting secular and nonsecular
interests like the ones at issue here, “courts have . . . held that ‘a spirit of
freedom for religious organizations’ prevails . . . even if that freedom
comes at the expense of other interests of high social importance”140
which in this case was Penley’s interest in confidentiality. As stated
If your brother sins, go and show him his fault in private; if he listens to you, you have
won your brother. But if he does not listen to you, take one or two more with you, so
that by the mouth of two or three witnesses every fact may be confirmed. If he refuses
to listen to them, tell it to the church; and if he refuses to listen even to the church, let
him be to you as a Gentile and a tax collector.
Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 392 n.1 (quoting Matthew 18:15-17 (New American Standard Bible)).
135. Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 392.
136. Id. at 402.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 402. See also, supra text accompanying notes 133-35.
139. Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 392.
140. Id. at 403 (citing Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952); Wisconsin
v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972)). See also, Westbrook 231 S.W.3d at 403 (stating that the
practice of shunning
“‘[does] not . . . . constitute a sufficient threat to the peace, safety, or morality of the
community as to warrant state intervention,’ and . . . . [that] ‘[i]ntangible or emotional
harms cannot ordinarily serve as a basis for maintaining a tort cause of action against a
church for its practices-or against its members.’”) (quoting Paul v. Watchtower Bible &
Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875, 883 (9th Cir. 1987); Dean v. Alford, 994
S.W.2d 392, 395 (Tex. Ct. App. 1999) (declaring that “‘the preservation of the free
exercise of religion is deemed so important a principle it overshadows the inequities
which may result from its liberal application’” (quoted in Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at
403)).
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earlier, Penley’s interest in confidentiality concerned facts about her
involvement in an extramarital sexual relationship and plans to divorce
her husband, which she communicated privately to Westbrook, the
pastor.141 In response to Penley’s disclosure, Westbrook counseled
Penley and recommended a lawyer who specialized in family law.142
Additionally, after Westbrook reminded Penley of the church
disciplinary policy applicable to members who engage in extramarital
affairs, Penley replied that she was relinquishing her church
membership.143
The Westbrook court dismissed the plaintiff’s case stating that her
“pleading affirmatively negate[d] the court’s subject-matter
jurisdiction.”144
It was apparent to the court that the former
parishioner’s professional-negligence action against the pastor defendant
“unconstitutionally impinge[d] upon internal matters of church
governance in violation of the First Amendment.”145
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT RELIGION CLAUSES: DEFENSES TO CLERGY
MALPRACTICE AND OTHER TORT CLAIMS AGAINST PASTORS AND
CHURCHES
Historically, courts declined to allow recovery in tort cases in
which the matter to be resolved entailed a religious dispute as opposed to
a secular conflict.146 According to the First Amendment to the United

141. Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 393.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 405.
145. Id.
146. The following are examples of cases involving tort claims and other legal issues in which
courts have discussed matters related to the Free Exercise or Establishment Clause. Various courts
have recognized the autonomy of churches to manage their own internal affairs, resolve their intrachurch disputes, decide those church matters that involve religious doctrine, and to be free of
governmental encroachment on an individual’s belief or legitimate practice of a particular faith or
denominational group. See, e.g., Cerninka v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No.
X10UWYCV085008855S, 2009 WL 765486 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2009); Marmelstein v.
Kehillat New Hempstead: The Rav Aron Jofen Community Synagogue, 892 N.E.2d 375 (N.Y.
2008); Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007); Hancock v. True Living Church of Jesus
Christ of Saints of Last Days, 118 P.3d 297 (Utah Ct. App. 2005); Wende C. v. United Methodist
Church, 776 N.Y.S.2d 390 (App. Div. 2004); Turner v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,
18 S.W.3d 877 (Tex. App. 2000); Williams v. Gleason, 26 S.W.3d 54 (Tex. App. 2000); Klagsbrun
v. Va’ad Harabonim of Greater Monsey, 53 F. Supp.2d 732 (D.N.J. 1999); Sanders v. Casa View
Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1998); Bell v. Presbyterian Church, 126 F.3d 328 (4th Cir.
1997); Najafi v. INS, 104 F.3d 943 (7th Cir. 1997); Amato v. Greenquist, 679 N.E.2d 446 (Ill. App.
1997); L. L. N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434 (Wis. 1997); Konkle v. Henson, 672 N.E.2d 450 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1996); H.R.B. v. J.L.G., 913 S.W.2d 92 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Young v. N. Ill. Conference
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States Constitution, “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”147
This Amendment containing, in part, two religion clauses applies to the
federal government and is applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment liberty component of the Due Process Clause.148 The
essence of the two religion clauses of the First Amendment is the
recognition of two areas of sovereignty when issues of government and
religion are being adjudicated.149
The two religion clauses
(establishment and free exercise provisions) “are designed to ‘prevent, as
far as possible, the intrusion of either [religion or government] into the
precincts of the other,’”150 and are grounded on the concept “that ‘both
religion and government can best work to achieve their lofty aims if each
is left free from the other within its respective sphere.’”151 The judicial
and legislative branches of the government are both restricted by the
First Amendment.152 The following subsections illustrate generally how
courts have responded to Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause
arguments presented by clergypersons, churches and other religious
organizations who have been sued for clergy malpractice and other
tortious misconduct related or unrelated to counseling services.

of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184 (7th Cir. 1994); E.E.O.C. v. Catholic Univ. of America,
856 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1994); Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425 (7th Cir. 1994); Shieffer v. Catholic
Archdiocese, 508 N.W.2d 907 (Neb. 1993); Drevlow v. Lutheran Church, Mo. Synod, 991 F.2d 468
(8th Cir. 1993); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993);
Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321 (S. D. N. Y. 1991); Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference
of United Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D. C. Cir. 1990); Nayak v. MCA, Inc., 911 F.2d 1082
(5th Cir. 1990); White v. Blackburn, 787 P.2d 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); Nally v. Grace
Community Church of the Valley, 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275
(Colo. 1988) (en banc); Paul v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N. Y., Inc., 819 F.2d 875 (9th
Cir. 1987); Baumgartner v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, 490 N.E.2d 1319, cert. denied, 479
U.S. 915 (1986); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth
Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344
U.S. 94 (1952); Minton v. Leavell, 297 S.W. 615 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927); Brown v. Clark, 116 S.W.
360 (Tex. 1909); Watson v. Jones, 80 U. S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871); Shannon v. Frost, 42 Ky. 253
(1842).
147. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
148. Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 395 (Tex. 2007) (citing Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940)); Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198,
202 (Utah 2001).
149. Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 395.
150. Id. at 395 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)).
151. Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 395 (quoting Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 410 (1985);
McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948)).
152. Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 395 (citing Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190,
191 (1960)).
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Establishment Clause Analysis

The United States Supreme Court addressed the Establishment
Clause in Lemon v. Kurtzman153 stating that this Clause requires “that
there should be ‘no law respecting an establishment of religion,’”154 not
simply prohibiting “the establishment of a state church or a state
religion.”155 The term “state” in this context means all levels of
government.156 Consequently, laws “that are ‘a step that could
[ultimately] lead to . . . [an] establishment’”157 of a religion may
constitute an infringement of the First Amendment even though they did
not initially establish a religion.158 According to the three-part test in the
Lemon case, in order for governmental activity or action not to qualify as
a “law respecting an establishment of religion,” three requirements must
be met.159 The governmental action (1) must have a “secular legislative
purpose,” (2) must “neither advance . . . nor inhibit . . . religion,” and (3)
“must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with
religion.’”160 Many courts have focused on the “excessive government
entanglement” prong of the Lemon test in deciding matters involving the
tort liability of clergypersons under the Establishment Clause.161 The
153. 403 U.S. 602 (1971). The Lemon case involved a Rhode Island statute and a Pennsylvania
statute providing state aid to parochial elementary and secondary schools. The statutes were
invalidated by the United States Supreme Court because they failed the excessive entanglement test
since the laws promoted an excessive entanglement between religion and government. Thus, the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment was contravened. Id. at 606-07, 613-14. For two
scholars’ analyses of the Lemon case, see also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1330-31 (6th ed. 2000).
154. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I). See also Franco v. The Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198, 203 (Utah 2001).
155. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. See also Franco, 21 P.3d at 203.
156. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
157. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. See also Franco, 21 P.3d at 203.
158. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612. See also Franco, 21 P.3d at 203.
159. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13. See also Franco, 21 P.3d at 203.
160. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
See also Franco, 21 P.3d at 198, 203; Gulbraa v. Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints, 159 P.3d 392, 394 (Utah Ct. App. 2007).
161. For examples of cases that have addressed or applied the “excessive entanglement” test
(the third prong of the Lemon test) or the Establishment Clause in general to various tort actions
against clergypersons and/or churches, see Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94 (1952);
Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709-10 (1976); Nally v. Grace
Community Church of the Valley, 763 P. 2d 948, 960 (Cal. 1988); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp
321, 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1991); Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1432 (7th Cir. 1994); H.R.B. v. J.L.G.,
913 S.W. 2d 92, 98-99 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995); Konkle v . Henson, 672 N.E. 2d 450, 454 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1996); L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W. 2d 434, 440 (Wis. 1997): Smith v. Privette, 495 S.E. 2d
395 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); Turner v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 18 S.W.3d 877,
897 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000); Franco v. The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 21 P.3d 198,
202-04, 206 (Utah 2001); A.B. v. Liberty United Methodist Church, 2002 WL 31890054 (Mo. Ct.
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excessive entanglement test examines the degree of the government’s
contact with religion. Due to the complex nature of present-day life,
church and state contact is unavoidable to some extent.162 Thus, the
concept of “separation of church and state” cannot be interpreted as “the
absence of all governmental contact with religion.”163
The Establishment Clause was asserted as a defense in Franco v.
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,164 in which a former
church member and her parents asserted clerical malpractice, negligent
and intentional infliction of emotional distress, breach of fiduciary duty,
fraud, and other claims against a church, some of the church officials,
and others.165 Referring to the third prong of the Lemon test, “excessive
government entanglement,” the court in Franco realized a well settled
rule “that civil tort claims against clerics that require the courts to review
and interpret church law, policies, or practices in the determination of
the claims are barred by the First Amendment under the entanglement
doctrine.”166 The court also recognized the authority of churches to
decide certain issues related to church governance, religious doctrine,
and faith without state interference.167 Conversely, if a tort action

App. W.D. 2002); Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., 268 F. Supp. 2d 139 (D. Conn.
2003); Ehrens v. Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, 269 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Olson v.
First Church of Nazarene, 661 N. W. 2d 254 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); J. M. v. Minnesota Dist.
Council of Assemblies of God, 658 N.W. 2d 589 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); Mars v. Diocese of
Rochester, 763 N.Y.S.2d 885 (Sup. Ct. 2003); Mabus v. St. James Episcopal Church (Mabus I), 884
So. 2d 747 (Miss. 2004); Wende C. V. United Methodist Church, 776 N.Y.S. 2d 390 (App. Div.
2004); Roman Catholic Diocese of Jackson v. Morrison, 905 So. 2d 1213 (Miss. 2005); Doe v.
Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 855 N.E. 2d 894 (Ohio Ct. App. 2006), rev’d by 880 N.E.2d 892;
Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 395 (Tex. 2007); Young v. Gelineau, No. PC/03-1302, 2007
R. I. Super. LEXIS 130, at *14-15 (Sept. 20, 2007); Gulbraa v. Corp. of the President of the Church
of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, 159 P.3d 392, 394-95 (Utah Ct. App. 2007); Lowery v. Cook,
No. 20061086-CA, 2007 Utah App. LEXIS 93, at *3 (March 15, 2007); Noll v. The Hartford
Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. HHDX04CV-02-4034702S, 2008 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2661
(Oct. 20, 2008); Marmelstein v. Kehillat New Hempstead: The Rav Aron Jofen Community
Synagogue, 892 N.E.2d 375, 378 (N.Y. 2008); Cerninka v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan
Corp., No. X10UWYCV085008855S, 2009 WL 765486, at *2-3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2009);
Mallory v. Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. X10UWYCV075007645S, 2009 WL
765485, at *2-3 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2009).
162. Franco, 21 P.3d at 203.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 201. See also supra text accompanying notes 86-100.
165. Id. at 200-01.
166. Id. at 203. See also Serbian E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709-10
(1976); Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1432 (7th Cir. 1994); L. L. N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434,
440 (Wis. 1997); Gulbraa v. Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints, 159 P.3d 392, 395 (Utah Ct. App. 2007).
167. Franco, 21 P.3d at 203-04. See also Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116
(1952).
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brought against a clergyperson is not germane to his theological efforts,
the entanglement doctrine does not prevent such a claim because it is not
within the scope of the First Amendment.168
The courts in Gulbraa v. Corp. of the President of the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints,169 White v. Blackburn,170 and Nally v.
Grace Community Church of the Valley,171 articulated a principle similar
to that in the Franco and Dausch v. Rykse cases. That principle provides
that the establishment of a claim for clerical malpractice “would create a
duty of care for clergy and ‘would necessarily . . . intertwine [that duty]
with the religious philosophy of [a] particular denomination or
ecclesiastical teachings of the religious entity’ with the courts.”172
A violation of the First Amendment was found in the case of
Hancock v. True & Living Church of Christ of Saints of the Last Days.173
This case involved an alleged misrepresentation made by a church to the
claimant that she would receive non-spiritual, as well as spiritual
assistance, in exchange for a contribution.174 Specifically, the church
promised the claimant property, support, and specified religious benefits
if she would make a monetary donation to the church.175 The church’s
promise to provide the claimant with property and support pertained to
earthly benefits that amounted to secular activity, which the court found
to be a violation of civil law.176 However, the promise of a “face-to-face
meeting with Jesus Christ” was found to be entirely spiritual in nature.177
Due to the religious character of the matter, the Hancock court
determined that this issue was “beyond . . . [its] ability to adjudicate,”178
thereby violating First Amendment principles.179 These principles
appear to be consistent with those in the Gulbraa, White, Nally, Franco,
and Dausch cases above.

168. Franco, 21 P.3d at 203 (citing Heath v. First Baptist Church, 341 So.2d 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1997) (involving a slip and fall negligence action against a church); Bass v. Aetna Ins. Co.,
370 So.2d 511 (La. 1979) (involving a negligence action against a church pastor for harm sustained
by a parishioner “running in the spirit” at a time when the pastor failed to clear the aisles to allow
for such religious expression)).
169. 159 P.3d 392 (Utah Ct. App. 2007).
170. 787 P.2d 1315 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
171. 763 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1988).
172. Gulbraa, 159 P.3d at 395; White, 787 P.2d at 1319; Nally, 763 P.2d at 960.
173. 118 P.3d 297 (Utah Ct. App. 2005).
174. Id. at 298-99.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 300.
177. Id. at 300, n.2.
178. Id.
179. Id.
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As illustrated in the preceding cases, courts have generally held that
adjudicating religious controversies would create a conflict with the First
Amendment. This holding has been interpreted as forbidding the
government from excessive entanglement with church by-laws, church
policies, church procedures, and church practices.180 Since the major
purpose of the Establishment Clause is to prevent excessive
governmental entanglement with religion, it has been said to be the basis
of the doctrine of judicial abstention.181 Consequently, when the concept
of judicial abstention or ecclesiastical abstention is addressed, the
emphasis is on the competence of a civil court to review or determine
religious controversies involving “church discipline, ecclesiastical
government,”182 or parishioners’ conformity to a required standard of
moral conduct.183 In other words, civil court review of church-related
issues would mandate a judicial investigation into “the doctrines and
order of an ecclesiastical legal order.”184
B.

Free Exercise Clause Analysis

Similar to the Establishment Clause cases, a number of courts have
considered actions involving the Free Exercise Clause in which
parishioners and others have sued church leaders, churches, and other
religious organizations.185 Courts have noted that the Free Exercise
Clause insures “the protection of two concepts, ‘freedom to believe and
freedom to act.’”186 “Freedom to believe” is said to be absolute while

180. House of God Which Is The Church Of The Living God, The Pillar And Ground Of The
Truth Without Controversy, Inc. v. White, 792 So.2d 491, 493 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001) (citing
L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 N.W.2d 434, 440 (Wis. 1997)).
181. Paul J. Morken, Church Discipline and Civil Tort Claims: Should Ecclesiastical
Tribunals Be Immune?, 28 IDAHO L. REV. 93, 116-17 (1991/1992).
182. Id. at 135. See also Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 395-400 (Tex. 2007).
183. Morken, supra note 181, at 135. See also Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d at 395-400.
184. Morken, supra note 181, at 135. See also Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d at 395-400.
185. See, e.g., Cerninka v. The Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No.
X10UWYCV085008855S, 2009 WL 765486 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2009); Mallory v. The
Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. X10UWYCV075007645S, 2009 WL 765485 (Conn.
Super. Ct. Feb. 24, 2009); Petrell v. Shaw, 902 N.E.2d 401, 409-10 (Mass. 2009); Noll v. The
Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. HHDX04CV-02-4034702S, 2008 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 2661, at *5-6 (Oct. 20, 2008); Young v. Gelineau, No. PC/03-1302, 2007 R.I. Super.
LEXIS 130, at *10, 14, 16, 17 (Sept. 20, 2007); Westbrook v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007);
Dausch v. Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1428, 1436-37 (7th Cir. 1994); Mabus v. St. James Episcopal
Church, 884 So.2d 747, 754-55 (Miss. 2004) (en banc); Richelle L. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop,
130 Cal. Rptr.2d 601, 616 (Ct. App. 2003), as modified Mar. 17, 2003; Sanders v. Casa View
Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 336-38 (5th Cir. 1998).
186. McNair v. Worldwide Church of God, 242 Cal. Rptr. 823, 830 (2d Dist. 1987).
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“freedom to act” or “religious conduct” is said to be subject to regulation
in order to safeguard the public.187
Recently, the Texas Supreme Court in the case of Westbrook v.
Penley,188 described two distinct ways that laws or governmental
conduct may burden the free exercise of religion. One way is by
hindering a person’s liberty to observe or practice a specific faith.189
The second way governmental action imposes a burden on religious
freedom is by intruding on a church’s ability to manage or govern its
own internal matters.190 The plaintiff in Westbrook was a former
parishioner who participated in marital counseling sessions with the
pastor (a licensed counselor) until she was shunned by the other church
members at the urging of the pastor-defendant.191 The reason for the
pastor’s conduct toward the plaintiff was her decision to divorce her
husband and a “biblically inappropriate” sexual relationship she was
having with another man.192 Plaintiff’s confidential disclosure to the
pastor concerning her extramarital affair and divorce decision caused the
pastor and church elders to write a letter to the congregation regarding
the plaintiff’s actions.193 Plaintiff’s claims against the church, the pastor,
and church elders for professional negligence, defamation, breach of
fiduciary duty, and the commission of other torts were dismissed by the
court.194 Finally, the Westbrook court concluded that the plaintiff’s
“professional-negligence claim against . . . [the pastor]
unconstitutionally impinge[d] upon internal matters of church
governance in violation of the First Amendment.”195
A federal appeals court in Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church,196
refused to find that the Free Exercise Clause barred claims against a
minister-defendant who was sued for counseling malpractice and breach
of fiduciary duty by two parishioners, who were also employees of the

187. Id. See also Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 335-38 (5th Cir. 1998);
Noll v. The Hartford Roman Catholic Diocesan Corp., No. HHDX04CV-02-4034702S, 2008 Conn.
Super. LEXIS 2661, at *5-29 (Oct. 20, 2008).
188. 231 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2007).
189. Id. at 395 (citing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520, 532 (1993)).
190. Westbrook, 231 S.W.3d at 395 (citing Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116
(1952); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 460 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
191. Westbrook, 231 SW3d at 392-93.
192. Id. at 393.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 394, 405.
195. Id. at 405.
196. 134 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 1998).
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church-defendant.197 The court affirmed the award of a summary
judgment by the lower court to the church, thereby declining to impose
liability on the church-defendant for negligence and Title VII violations
(discrimination and termination based on gender).198 Furthermore, there
was no vicarious liability imposed on the church under the doctrine of
respondeat superior for the minister’s sexual relationship with the two
parishioners that occurred during the period they were receiving marital
counseling in which they revealed intimate details about their sexual
backgrounds and marriages to the minister.199 The minister maintained
that the two parishioners’ claims were not actionable because the clergy
misconduct occurred within “inherently ecclesiastical” counseling
relationships instead of “purely secular” counseling situations.200 The
minister’s position, therefore, was that certain religious controversies are
prohibited from being judicially reviewed based on the First
Amendment.201 More specifically, the minister’s assertions that he was
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law focused on the following:
occasional or intermittent discussions of scripture in the marital
counseling sessions verifying that the minister’s advice and assistance
were not purely secular or that the evidence established that the two
parishioners’ allegations were actually noncognizable actions for “clergy
malpractice.”202
The court in Sanders disagreed with the minister’s argument that he
was entitled to a judgment as a matter of law stating that “[t]he First
Amendment does not categorically insulate religious relationships from
judicial scrutiny, for to do so would necessarily extend constitutional
protection to the secular components of these relationships.”203 Further,
the court noted that if it were to accept the minister’s position that the
Free Exercise Clause prevents judicial review of relationships that do not
qualify as “purely secular,” this could result in the abolition of civil or
criminal responsibility for members of the clergy involved in critical
religious relationships.204 Even if an ecclesiastical relationship between
a minister and a congregant only partially includes “secular beliefs and
behavior,” the Sanders court maintained that religious freedom
guaranteed under the Constitution cannot be interpreted by the courts as
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
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safeguarding those “secular beliefs and behavior.”205 Therefore,
according to Sanders, if courts do construe and hold that freedom of
religion protects secular beliefs and behavior, religious officials would
be “impermissibly place[d] . . . in a preferred position in our society.”206
Courts have repeatedly expressed how the Free Exercise Clause has
protected clergyperson-parishioner religious relationships and
counseling relationships mainly by preventing courts from deciding
theological disputes that focus on issues concerning “religious doctrine
or practice.” This was articulated in Sanders v. Casa View Baptist
Church,207 Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Memorial Presbyterian Church,208 and Thomas v. Review Bd. Of Ind.
Employment Security Div.209
The sacredness of the religious
relationship and the counseling relationship is safeguarded further by
other religious freedoms according to the courts in Employment Div. v.
Smith210 and Wisconsin v. Yoder.211 Clergy malpractice actions have
been “rejected uniformly” by state courts because the judiciary must
refrain or abstain from deciding ecclesiastical conflicts concerning
matters of doctrine or practice212 because clergy malpractice requires
that the pertinent standard of care be defined.213 If the courts define that
standard, they could become involved in “establishing the training, skill,
and standards applicable for members of the clergy in a diversity of
religions with widely varying beliefs.”214 Additionally, describing that
standard would obligate “courts to identify the beliefs and practices of
the relevant religion and then . . . determine whether the clergyman had
acted in accordance”215 with those beliefs and practices. In other words,
according to the Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church case, in order for
a clergy malpractice action to be recognized, courts would be compelled

205. Id.
206. Id. at 336 (citing Cf. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989)
(interpreting the first Amendment to preclude the state from favoring religion over nonreligion)).
207. For a discussion of the Free Exercise Clause’s protection of clergyperson-parishioner
religious and counseling relationships, see Sanders, 134 F.3d at 336.
208. 393 U.S. 440, 449-50 (1969).
209. 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981) ((setting out the rule that “[c]ourts are not arbiters of
scriptural interpretation”) (emphasis added)).
210. 494 U.S. 872, 877-78, 881 (1990).
211. 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
212. Sanders v. Casa View Baptist Church, 134 F.3d 331, 337 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Dausch v.
Rykse, 52 F.3d 1425, 1432 (7th Cir. 1994)(Ripple, J., concurring); Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d
275 (Colo. 1988) (en banc); F. G. v. MacDonell, 696 A.2d 697, 703 (N.J. 1997)).
213. See F.G., 696 A.2d at 703; Sanders, 134 F.3d at 337.
214. Sanders, 134 F.3d at 337. See also F.G., 696 A.2d at 703.
215. Sanders, 134 F.3d at 337. See also F.G., 696 A.2d at 703.
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to “identify and apply the teachings of a particular faith.”216 This
imposes a duty on the courts to decide which conduct and beliefs are
components of a particular faith or religion.217
The Sanders court noted that when the duties upon which a
claimant’s clergy malpractice action against a minister, who provides
marriage counseling and breaches fiduciary duties do not stem from
religious tenets, the First Amendment will not protect the minister from
liability.218 Since the jury in the United States District Court determined
that the minister held himself out to the claimants as having “the
education and experience of a professional marriage counselor,”219 the
minister’s “counseling activities with the . . . [claimants] were judged,
not by a standard of care defined by religious teachings, but by a
professional standard of care developed through expert testimony
describing what a reasonably prudent counselor would have done under
the same or similar circumstances.”220 The United States Court of
Appeals agreed with the District Court and concluded that the two
claimants were entitled to a favorable judgment on the basis that their
claims were not barred by a constitutional principle derived from the
First Amendment that provides for judicial abstention.221 In other
words, the principle “that the judiciary must abstain from ecclesiastical
disputes concerning questions of religious doctrine and practice”222 did
not insulate the minister in Sanders from liability since his conduct
toward the claimants was not based on the theological beliefs and
practices of his church.223 Therefore, the minister-defendant did not
receive a judgment as a matter of law.224
V. CONCLUSION: MINIMIZING LIABILITY FOR CHURCH-RELATED
COUNSELING SERVICES
Minimizing liability for church-related counseling services is
imperative in view of the frequency and increased number of lawsuits
being brought against churches, pastors, and other church officials in
recent years.
Various legal practitioners and scholars have

216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
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recommended that churches and other religious organizations do the
following to minimize their liability: take reasonable care in hiring
pastors; adopt and follow a pastoral counseling policy emphasizing
biblical advice as opposed to mental health or family therapy; employ
counseling agreements; refer parishioners to psychiatric or other
professional counselors if necessary; avoid counseling persons under
particular situations, especially members of the opposite sex; keep
records of the counseling sessions; comply with state licensing laws
applicable to professional counselors; and procure professional liability
insurance that covers negligent acts, and other omissions and errors
committed by pastors and others with counseling responsibilities.225 The
sections below address each of the preceding items.
A.

Utilizing Reasonable Care In Hiring A Pastor Or Counselor226

●

Prior to appointing a pastor or engaging the services of a counselor,
a church must investigate the person’s background to determine his
or her experience, credentials, character, and overall fitness.
Work history information may be obtained by contacting secular
employers, churches or other organizations for whom the candidate
has worked or served in the past years.
A criminal background check should be conducted in the states in
which the candidate has been employed. If practical, investigate
the states where the candidate has resided even if the candidate was
not employed or did not serve in a church in those states.
Request that the candidate give the church permission to do a
criminal record investigation by signing a consent form designed
for that purpose.
The church’s employment process should also comprise the usual
tools like “applications, detailed interviews, reference and
education verifications, and follow-up evaluations.”227

●
●

●
●

225. GIBBS LAW FIRM, supra note 34, at 74-82; TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 87, 94-96, 99-105,
115-18.
226. GIBBS LAW FIRM, supra note 34, at 74. See also Christian Life Commission, Broken
Trust: Confronting Clergy Sexual Misconduct 32 (n.d.).
227. GIBBS LAW FIRM, supra note 34, at 74-75.
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B.

Adopting A Pastoral Counseling Policy Emphasizing Biblical
Advice

●

Create and approve a pastoral counseling policy, and request that
the pastoral counselor or church official who is providing such
services sign an agreement to comply with the policy.228
The pastoral counselor or church official, who is providing spiritual
guidance to parishioners, should emphasize and restrict his or her
assistance to biblical counseling unless he or she has received
training from an accredited institution and is licensed by the state as
a professional counselor. A pastoral counselor or church official
who does not have such credentials should avoid giving “medical,
mental health, . . . family therapy,” marriage counseling or other
nonbiblical counseling and refer parishioners to the appropriate
professionals.229
Since the pastoral counselor should emphasize biblical or spiritual
counseling during his or her meetings with counselees, suggested
methods of maintaining a spiritual focus include: (a) praying at the
beginning of the session; (b) keeping a Bible present, open, and
clearly visible during the session; (c) reading one or more Scripture
references during the session; (d) assigning scriptural homework to
the counselee; and (e) praying at the end of the session.230
The counseling policy should require the counselor to be cautious
about those to whom he or she provides counsel. Selectiveness as
to those individuals one chooses to counsel is crucial. It is much
more difficult to terminate a counseling relationship than it is to
start one.231

●

●

●

C.

Employing A Counseling Agreement232

●

Adults who are being counseled should be required to sign a
Counseling Agreement on behalf of himself or herself or on behalf
of his or her minor child depending on who is the counselee.
The person who signs the Counseling Agreement acknowledges
and accepts that the type of counseling he or she receives is
Biblical, not professional.

●

228. Id. at 75. See also TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 100.
229. GIBBS LAW FIRM, supra note 34, at 75. See also Constance F. Fain, Clergy Malpractice:
Liability for Negligent Counseling and Sexual Misconduct, 12 MISS. C. L. REV. 97, 123-24 (1991).
230. GIBBS LAW FIRM, supra note 34, at 75-76.
231. Id. at 75.
232. Id. at 76.
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The person who signs the agreement is indicating his or her
acknowledgment that the pastor or other person that provides the
counseling services is not a state licensed “counselor, social
worker, or therapist.”233 That signature also expresses recognition
that the counselor has not been trained as a “professional in
psychological counseling, psychiatric therapy, or marriage and
family counseling or therapy . . . .”234
By signing the agreement, the counselee indicates his or her
willingness not to file a claim against the church for any costs or
damages caused by the counseling services of the pastor, other
church official or pastoral counselor.
Signing the agreement represents the counselee’s consent for
certain confidential communications to be reported to the proper
state law enforcement authorities because the law mandates
disclosure.235 Examples of matters that may fall into this category
are child abuse, threats to seriously harm or kill another, or other
menacing remarks of violence that could lead to personal or
property damage.236

D.

Referring Parishioners To Psychiatric Or Other Professional
Counselors

●

Parishioners who are experiencing severe problems that necessitate
the services of a professional counselor should be referred to a
psychiatric counselor or medical professional.237
A Baptist minister who has served as a pastoral counselor at a
counseling and education center has recommended that a
clergyperson make referrals to the appropriate professionals or
agencies when encountering a counselee with any of the following
problems:238
1) Counselee who has suicidal thoughts and actions: when a
person talks about his or her own death or funeral, the cleric

●

233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. GIBBS LAW FIRM, supra note 34, at 83 app. This Appendix contains two Counseling
Agreements entitled: (1) Sample Adult Counseling Agreement; and (2) Sample Minor Counseling
Agreement.
237. Id. at 76. See also TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 116-17. For a discussion of a pastoral or
denominational counselor’s duty to investigate a parishioner counselee’s suicidal tendencies and
make a referral to an appropriate professional, see Nally, 763 P.2d at 953-54, 957.
238. Fain, supra note 229, at 123-24. See also TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 116-17.
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should ask direct questions regarding the counselee’s thoughts
of taking his or her own life. The cleric should stay with the
person, notify a family member, and recommend professional
help. Confidentiality may be breached when a person is
suicidal.
2) Counselee who talks a lot about near accidents: This could
indicate that the person has an emotional problem.
3) Counselee who has alcohol and drug dependency problems.
4) Counselee who abuses his or her children: the cleric should
inform the counselee that he or she must be reported to the
state Child Protective Service Agency or other appropriate
legal agency, because such conduct is illegal, and because the
cleric cares about the family.
5) Counselee who is being abused (child or spouse).
6) Child-counselee who fails to perform to his or her capacity:
he or she should be referred for appropriate therapy.
7) Counselees who have extreme marital problems.
8) Counselee who is having a lot of difficulty with life
transitions.
9) Counselee who is having serious problems related to puberty.
10) Counselee who is having more than the normal difficulty
developing relationships with the opposite sex.
11) Counselee who is experiencing out of the ordinary family
problems with older children.
12) Counselee who is having unusual difficulty adjusting to a
newborn child.
13) Counselee who is having unusual difficulty with the empty
nest syndrome.
14) Counselee who is having extreme difficulty adjusting to
retirement.
A Presbyterian minister, who established himself as an expert in
pastoral care, has suggested a three-point test for determining
whether a clergyperson should refer a counselee to a mental health
professional or social worker.239 The cleric must ask himself or
herself three questions: (1) do I have the time to work with the
counselee as long as he or she needs assistance; (2) do I have the
proper skills and training to handle the counselee’s problems; and
(3) do I have the emotional strength to deal with the counselee’s

●

239. Fain, supra note 229, at 123.
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problems?240 If any of these questions are answered in the
negative, the cleric should refer the counselee to a mental health
professional, social worker or some other professional who has
been trained to handle the counselee’s particular type of problem.241
E.

Avoiding Particular Counseling Situations

●

In order to have more control over the counseling relationship and
the circumstances involved, the person providing the pastoral
counseling services to the counselee should seriously consider the
suggestions below. Adherence to these suggestions is likely to
prevent liability producing conduct on the part of the pastoral
counselor.242
1) The counseling session, especially with the opposite sex,
should be in clear view, perhaps in a room with a window or
on a pew in the sanctuary as long as third persons are not able
to hear the conversation.243
2) A church staff member, the pastor’s wife or some other
trustworthy third person of the same gender should “remain
within easy line-of-sight with the counselor” for protection
purposes without destroying the clergy-parishioner or
counselor-counselee privilege.244
3) If the counseling is conducted in a clearly visible open area or
within the presence of a third party, emotional attachment will
most likely be avoided, thereby safeguarding the pastor or
counselor from groundless allegations of wrongful conduct.245
4) If the person providing the counseling services adheres to the
preceding suggestions, an adulterous relationship would most

240. Id.
241. Id. A policy for handling complaints of alleged unethical professional conduct by
clergypersons within the pastoral-parishioner relationship was developed in 1987 by the Northwest
District of the American Lutheran Church. It contained the following provision focusing on
appropriate referrals as part of pastoral care:
Referral is a vital subject to be learned. Appropriate referral is pastoral care.
Knowledge of the limits of one’s ability and time is a strength in ministry. The pastor’s
professional role and personal life are usually enhanced when his/her role is one of
pastoral care, concern and spiritual nourishment while in-depth counseling is handled by
an outside professional with whom the pastor is familiar. How to refer in a helpful way
is a learned skill appreciated by most laypeople.
FORTUNE, supra note 34, at 152.
242. GIBBS LAW FIRM, supra note 34, at 77-78.
243. Id. at 77.
244. Id. at 77-78.
245. Id. at 77.
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likely be prevented because the pastoral counselor’s
temptation for improper sexual activity may be eliminated. It
has been reported that 71% of extramarital affairs involving
pastors began in connection with pastoral counseling
sessions.246
If the parent(s) of a minor-counselee is not home, then the
pastoral counselor should not go into the child’s home.247
The pastoral counselor should not engage in inappropriate
touching with the counselee.
The pastoral counselor should clearly communicate the
church’s position that sexual or romantic relationships
between counselors and counselees are “absolutely
prohibited.”248
The counselor must take the proper steps to guarantee
“confidentiality of the counseling sessions.”249

F.

Keeping Counseling Records250

●

Since the discussions that take place during counseling sessions are
important in providing the counselee with appropriate spiritual
guidance and in protecting the pastor or counselor from tort actions,
thorough records of the sessions should be kept. Thorough records
should include detailed notes containing the following data:
1) Names of the persons present at the sessions and the reason(s)
why they are there.
2) Date, day and time of the sessions.
3) Location of the sessions.
4) Total number of the sessions.
5) The counselee’s problem and the private nature of the related
matters addressed in the sessions.
6) A “reasonable suspicion” on the counselor’s part or allegations
made by the counselee during sessions concerning the
occurrence of child abuse or violent behavior.
7) Threats made by the counselee during a session(s) to injure
himself or third persons.

246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
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8)

●

Behavior on the part of the counselee or statements made
during one or more sessions indicating he or she is under the
influence of alcohol or illegal drugs.
9) Biblical advice provided during the sessions, including
particular scriptures relied on as authority.
10) The pastoral counselor’s specific recommendations to the
counselee on how he or she should or should not handle the
problems he or she is experiencing.
The pastoral counselor’s records of the counseling sessions should
be placed in a confidential file which is not accessible to anyone
other than the counselor.

G.

Complying With State Licensing Laws251

●

The majority of state licensing laws do not apply to theological
counselors unless they misrepresent their qualifications or use
professional titles incorrectly.
Pastors should be careful to avoid violating any state laws that
impose criminal penalties for: (1) misrepresenting “themselves as
being licensed by the state”;252 (2) misrepresenting “themselves as
being professional marriage, family, or mental health professionals;
[or] (3) [charging] . . . fees for their counseling services.”253

●

H.

Procuring Professional Liability Insurance

●

Churches should procure “professional liability insurance” to
protect pastors and other church workers who commit negligent
acts in carrying out their counseling responsibilities. This type of
insurance is also referred to as “errors and omissions insurance.”254
“Pastoral counseling” coverage should be included as a component
of the church’s insurance policy for biblical or spiritual counseling
errors (negligent acts or omissions). 255

●

251. Id. at 80.
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. GIBBS LAW FIRM, supra note 34, at 81.
255. Id. at 81. See also TAYLOR, supra note 34, at 118. See, e.g., Nally, 763 P.2d at 960. The
court in Nally referred to the availability of clergyman malpractice insurance intended “to protect
against potential liability for spiritual counseling that causes injury.” Id.
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I.

Additional Ways Of Minimizing Church Counseling Liability

●

It has been suggested that the pastor or counselor put a limit on the
number of counseling sessions, and include this restriction in the
Counseling Agreement for the following reasons:256
1) This limitation on the number of counseling sessions should
guarantee that the pastor sets aside adequate time to handle
other pastoral responsibilities.
2) This limitation on the number of counseling sessions should
reduce the danger of the relationship between the pastor and
the counselee developing into one of intimacy or alienation.
It has been reported that many counselees leave their churches
because they feel exposed or think they are being used as examples
in sermons after being counseled over long periods of time.
Limiting the number of counseling sessions may prevent this
feeling of exposure on the part of counselees and prevent their
ultimate withdrawal from their churches. 257
All counseling appointments should be written on a master calendar
schedule to be used for upcoming meetings and as a business record
of past meetings. Since this type of schedule keeps the pastor’s
staff aware of his or her location, the appearance of an
“inappropriate secret rendezvous” between the pastor and the
counselee would be avoided. 258
Churches should adopt a written counseling policy that restricts
pastoral counseling to Biblical or spiritual guidance to protect
against state control of pastoral counseling programs.259

●

●

●

In sum, the recommendations listed above are designed to help
pastors, churches and other religious organizations avoid or at least
minimize their liability for clergy malpractice, negligent counseling and
other tortious conduct; therefore, this writer believes that a good strategy
would be to adopt these recommendations. Historically, based on
statistics, it has been observed that in times of emotional strain or
anxiety more parishioners have sought counseling from their clerics than
from other professionals, such as psychologists, social workers,
psychiatrists, and other types of physicians.260 Apparently, many people

256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
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feel more comfortable and secure taking their problems to clergypersons
than to unknown mental health professionals.261 Consequently, the cleric
is able to get involved in the parishioner’s situation at an earlier stage
than other professionals.262 Of course, financial limitations may also
prevent many people from seeking other types of professional assistance.
Since pastors are regularly being approached by congregants who need
counseling services, churches should clearly see why due diligence
should be utilized in the hiring of pastors and counselors by reasonably
investigating their credentials, character, and overall fitness. Pastors
should restrict their assistance to spiritual guidance and avoid giving
parishioners mental health, family, marital, or other types of counseling
unless pastors have the proper credentials.
Selectiveness by the pastor in deciding which persons to counsel
and referral of certain individuals to the proper professionals to handle
problems involving suicidal thoughts, alcohol dependency, drug abuse,
child or spousal abuse, difficulty adjusting to a newborn child, or other
severe difficulties is crucial for the protection of the church and pastor,
and ultimately the counselee-parishioner. Requiring that a written
counseling agreement be signed by a counselee acknowledging that he is
receiving Biblical counseling, not professional advice or guidance, and
keeping detailed counseling records are critical in limiting lawsuits
against the church, pastor, or counselor. Ignoring state licensing laws
applicable to counselors and representing oneself as having a license
may lead to tort liability or the imposition of criminal penalties;
therefore, pastors must be familiar with relevant laws. Maintaining
control over the counseling relationship and the circumstances involved
is essential, because a failure to do so may lead to sexual misconduct,
breach of confidentiality, or other legal or moral transgressions. Finally,
pastors and other church workers who commit negligent acts in carrying
out their counseling responsibilities may be protected if churches obtain
professional liability insurance. Clearly, these and other strategies may
be used effectively to safeguard churches, pastors, counselors and
parishioners involved in church-related counseling services.

261. Id. at 220.
262. Id.
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